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ABSTRACT 
 
I apply the target revenue model, a version of prospect theory, to investigate how fishermen 
adjust their trip length to changes in daily revenue. The key finding is that certain groups of 
fishermen seem more likely to behave according to the target revenue model rather than the 
standard model of labor supply. Asian American captains seem more likely to behave 
according to the target revenue model than Caucasian captains. I also find that vessel 
capacity has little effect on the captain’s decision making behavior. The study strongly 
supports the integration of prospect theory into the framework of labor supply analysis.  
 
Key Words: Behavioral economics; Fisheries; Hawaii Longline; Prospect Theory; Target 
revenue model. 
 3
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fishing effort, as measured by the number of fishing days for a given trip is probably one 
of the most important  decisions for any fisherman.  Studies on fishing effort have been 
widely published.  To the best of our knowledge, all of these studies  use the standard 
assumptions of economic theory, namely that economic agents are rational and self-
interested. In this paper, I explore the fishermen’s decision-making behavior on the number 
of fishing days per trip by applying an alternative framework using the target revenue model.  
I will see how having a target revenue may influence the fisherman’s decision regarding trip 
length and how this may result in a different prediction from the standard economic model 
regarding the relationship between daily fishing revenue and the number of fishing days. To 
investigate which model provides a more reasonable description of reality, I observe the 
empirical evidence from the Hawaii-based longline fisheries.  
I credit a paper by Camerer et al. (1997) who apply the target revenue model on the taxi 
drivers in New York City as our primary inspiration for this research.  Camerer et al. find 
strong evidence to show that  cab drivers may behave according to the target revenue model 
as far as how many hours they work per day is concerned. As discussed later, fishermen and 
taxi drivers share a number of similar characteristics.  These common characteristics make it 
worthwhile to study fishing behavior under the same framework as Camerer et al.     
There are, however, factors that make fishery an interesting case study in and of itself. 
First, fishermen face capacity constraints for fuel and food supplies. These constraints may 
result in shortening the trip despite having not achieved the target revenue goal for a given 
trip as predicted by the target revenue model.  Second, Hawaii longline fisheries consists of 
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owners from different ethnic groups, each may behave differently in the decision-making 
process. Accordingly, certain groups of owners may be more likely to behave in accordance 
with the standard economic model; whereas the others are more likely to behave according to 
the target revenue model. Third, longline fishing experience is highly correlated with rational 
behavior defined in the standard model: the longer the fisherman has been longline fishing, 
the more likely he will behave according to the standard model (Camerer et al., 1997). 
In this paper, I are going to investigate the following questions: (1) How well does the 
target revenue model describe the fishing behavior of Hawaii longline fishermen? (2) How 
do capacity constraints impact fishermen’s behavior under the target revenue model 
framework?  (3) How does ethnicity impact fishermen’s behavior under the target revenue 
model framework? and (4) How significant does longline fishing experience have on 
fishermen behaving according to the target revenue model framework?  
 
II. A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
An Inter-temporal Model of Labor Supply in Fishery  
 
A great number of recent studies on labor supply have followed the inter-temporal 
formulation of the standard neoclassical model (Camerer et al., 1997; Chou, 2003; Farber, 
2006).  Applying this standard formulation to fishery, the number of fishing days for a trip 
can be determined by solving the lifetime utility function defined over lifetime consumption 
and fishing days. In particular, consider maximizing the lifetime utility of a fisherman with 
time separable utility function: 
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where u(ct) is the utility gained from consumption ct in period t and v(dt) is the disutility from 
fishing effort, dt, in the same period. By standard assumptions, u(ct) is concave whereas v(dt) 
is convex. wt and pt are the daily revenue  and the price of consumption good in period t, 
respectively. β is the discount factor  and ρ is the interest rate.  
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Solving the first order condition with respect to ct and dt, results in 
t t
t t
t
L 0 u'(c ) p (1 )                                                                              
c
−∂ = ⇔β =λ +ρ∂                                (4) 
t t
t t
t
L 0 v '(d ) w (1 )                             
d
−∂ = ⇔ β = λ + ρ∂                                                   (5) 
From (4) and (5), we can derive the following 
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where rt is the real daily revenue. 
 
Taking the expectation for t+1 at t,  we have 
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Dividing (7) by (6), we have  
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Now suppose the vessel operator expects an increase in the real daily fishing revenue 
in the next period, i.e., E(rt+1) > rt.  From (8), by keeping the consumption level constant, it 
must be the case that v’((E(dt+1))> v’(dt).  By recalling the assumption of convexity of v(dt), 
we can then derive that E (dt+1) > dt.  In other words, the model implies that under the 
standard framework that there is a positive correlation between the number of fishing days 
and the daily revenue.   
Studies on the supply of labor have empirically shown little support for the standard 
model’s prediction (Falk: 2004, 2006).  Most studies, rather, have found a positive 
correlation between labor wages and labor supply, though these results are not significant.  
This insignificant relationship found in the empirical studies is attributed to a number of 
factors. For instance, in many settings workers are required to work a fixed number of hours 
per day regardless of their hourly wage (Falk, 2004).  Another question is whether changes in 
wages are temporary or permanent with respect to the time horizon of the decision-making 
framework.  Under the standard model of labor supply, decisions are made under a long-run 
or lifelong horizon.  Most empirical studies in fisheries, however, assume that decision 
making are short-term (i.e., a fishing trip). This short-run time horizon, for example, certainly 
impacts on the standard model’s predictions of fishermen’s behavior (Lokina, 2006).   
In the search of a model to bridge the gap between theoretical prediction and 
empirical evidence, increasing attention has been paid to the target revenue model which 
offers an alternative description of labor supply. In what follows, I will briefly review the 
labor supply studies based on the target revenue model.     
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 Revenue Target Model: A Prospect Theory Based Model 
 
The seminal paper by Camerer et al. (1997) on the labor supply of taxi drivers in New 
York City is the first study on labor supply under the prospect theory framework.  Camerer’s 
basic estimation equation takes the following form: 
i,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,tlog(h ) log(Y / h ) X= α +β + ϕ+ ε  
where i,th  is the number of driving hours by driver i on day t; i,tY  is driver i’s income on day 
t; i ,tX  is a vector of other variables that may have an effect on the number of driving hours. 
Camerer et al. find a negative elasticity for the taxi driver’s working hours with respect to 
hourly wage in the range of [-0.61, -0.18]. According to the authors, the negative relationship 
between number of working hours and average wage rate results from the fact that each taxi 
driver has a daily target income level.  On a given day, drivers continue driving until they 
achieve their target income levels.  On a productive day with many customers, it takes only a 
few hours to meet that target goal.  Conversely, on days with fewer customers, it takes more 
hours to reach that same target level.  
Following the Camerer et al. paper, a number of labor supply studies based on target 
revenue model have been conducted. Using a similar approach, Chou (2002) finds that 
Singaporean cab drivers exhibit exactly the same decision making behavior on time 
allocation as those in New York City.  Fehr and Gotte (2007) provide an innovative method 
of labor supply study. They use a randomized field experiment to explore how bike 
messengers in San Francisco respond to changes in hourly wages.  They estimate the loss 
aversion parameters of the participants and find that messengers with strong loss aversion 
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behaved in accordance with the target revenue model.  Conversely, messengers with less loss 
aversion appear to follow the standard model of labor supply, i.e., they increase effort levels 
in response to an increase in the piece rate.  
In support of the standard inter-temporal model, Farber (2004, 2008) conducts a study 
also on New York taxi drivers. Farber’s approach focuses on the probability of continuing to 
drive at any given time by asserting that the greater the number of accumulated driving 
hours, the lower the probability a driver continues to drive. He argues that the key factor in 
determining the cab driver’s daily driving hours is the number of hours driven.  Farber’s 
empirical model takes the following hazard model form:  
i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,t i ,tStop Y h X= α +β + δ + Γ + ε  
The dependent variable is a binary variable i,tStop = 1, if driver i stops at time t. Yi,t is 
the cumulative income level for driver i given he stops at time t; hi,t is his cumulative driving 
hours, and Xit is other independent variables. To investigate how well the target revenue 
model explains the data, Farber aims at answering the question: Does a higher cumulative 
earning i,tY  lead to an increase in the probability of stopping (β > 0)? The estimated 
coefficient β would be positive and significant if cab drivers behaved according to the target 
revenue model. Farber finds a positive but not significant effect of cumulative earning i,tY on 
the probability of stopping. This finding is qualitatively consistent with the target income 
model.  Farber also finds a significant and positive impact of cumulative working hours on 
the probability of stopping which gives support for the standard model of labor supply. 
Fisheries serve as an ideal application for the target revenue model because of the 
short time horizon of the decision making process and the uncertainties surrounding each 
trip.  Decision on the length of a fishing trip is made one trip at a time.  This short time 
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horizon differs from the standard model’s assumption of using a lifelong horizon.  There is 
also a great deal of uncertainty surrounding each trip as it is possible that a vessel can have 
one very profitable trip followed by a very unprofitable trip, and the reasons may be due to 
uncontrollable factors such as bad weather or poor fishing grounds.  Due to these reasons, it 
is not easy for a vessel operator to expect a certain return for each fishing trip and, thus, will 
also not know how long each trip will last. A possible strategy for the vessel operator is to 
establish a target revenue goal. This goal acts as a reference point to help decide whether to 
continue the fishing trip or not.  From interviews with vessel operators in the Hawaii longline 
fisheries, I found that a majority of vessel operators do mentally have a target revenue goal 
for each fishing trip. The target revenue is typically the vessel’s previous years’ average trip 
revenue.  For example, operators of average size longline vessels, mentioned aiming for a 
revenue of $20,000 for each trip.  Once the operator has reached this goal he would very 
likely conclude the trip and return home.  The probability of continuing the fishing trip after 
achieving $19,000 is much greater than continuing after receiving $21,000 of revenue. 
Psychologically, it is true that people will more likely work harder prior to reaching a goal 
than after exceeding that goal (Fehr and Falk, 2002).  According to Goette et al. (2004), it is 
this type of decision-making behavior that makes the Kahneman–Tversky prospect theory a 
relevant framework in our study.  
Given its unique feature of the decision-making process, fisheries also serve as an 
ideal application for the study of labor supply under the target revenue model.  First, 
fishermen enjoy the flexibility to choose  trip’s fishing length which in turn allows for 
enough variation in the number of fishing days from trips to trips and vessels to vessels. 
Variation in the number of fishing days makes it possible to use fishing length as the 
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dependent variable. Second, because there is little correlation between the trip revenue from 
different trips, it is reasonable to consider each fishing trip in isolation.  If the vessel operator 
made decisions based on two trips as opposed to one, for instance, the additional revenue 
from one productive trip could offset the loss in the other unproductive trip.  In order to reach 
the revenue target for the two trips, the vessel operator may fish longer during the productive 
trip and shorter during the unproductive trip.  Despite having a revenue target (for the two 
trips together), the vessel operator’s behavior follows in suit with the inter-temporal model of 
labor supply.          
In general, fishing decisions regarding trip length is a very complex process due to a 
number of factors, like vessel capacity and auction fish prices. Vessel physical capacity 
determines the length of time that a vessel can fish for.  The ability to produce ice during a 
trip is crucial in lengthening the amount of time a vessel is out at sea.  Fish price, which is 
controlled by market supply and demand forces, can directly impact trip revenue and induce 
uncertainty regarding trip length. Fish prices are determined by high level of competition at 
the local United Fishing Agency fish auction and are also influenced by the number of 
fishing boats choosing to offload on a particular day.  Depending on the number of boats 
offloading to the fish auction, vessel operators may gamble by shortening a trip and catching 
fewer pieces of fish, and offloading on a day with fewer boats at the auction with the hope of 
securing higher prices to compensate for the lower quantity in fish pieces. 
This paper greatly simplifies this complex process by assuming that the vessel 
operator has a revenue target, as opposed to a target quantity of fish pieces caught. This 
assumption may cause one to ask how the vessel operator can estimate the accumulated 
revenue of the trip especially when the auction fish price fluctuates on a daily basis.  This is 
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possible thanks to the constant communication between the captain who is monitoring the 
boat in the ocean and the owner who follows closely what happens at the auction.  Focusing 
solely on revenue rather than on fish prices will significantly simplify this complex price 
mechanism. Regarding the vessel’s physical constraint to stay longer in the ocean, I use ice 
maker as a proxy for vessel capacity. Having ice maker enables larger and typically shallow-
set vessels to fish longer.  When fish are placed in an ice hole and are regularly repacked to 
maintain a desired level of freshness over the course of many weeks out at sea, ice will melt 
and will have to be replaced by fresh ice from an ice maker.  Otherwise, there exists a trade-
off between the fish quality and the trip length.   
 
III.  A REVENUE TARGET MODEL IN FISHERY 
 
Our primary interest is seeing how having a target revenue goal impacts trip length.  I 
first assume that this revenue goal is consistent for both the owner and the captain.  
Furthermore, I assume that the owner and the captain have the same objectives and jointly 
decide on the trip length.  This second assumption is reasonable as net trip revenue is often 
shared between the owner and the captain.  Moreover, joint decision making reflects how the 
information is transferred during the fishing trip.  The captain is informed of their fishing 
productivity while the owner is cognizant of the market conditions at the auction.  This 
cooperative effort is a common practice in fisheries and shows how each plays an equal role 
in deciding on the trip length. 
Decisions on trip length are made one trip at a time rather than over an entire 
lifecycle.  Hence, our model is based on a single trip.  To incorporate revenue goal-setting, I 
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assume that the captain’s preference takes the following form: 
1U(Y,d) (Y T) d                   (Y<T)                                   
1
+γθ= α − − + γ                            (9) 
1U(Y,d) (Y T) d                      (Y>T)
1
+γθ= − − + γ                                                                (10) 
where U(Y,d) is the utility function under prospect theory. d is the number of fishing days.  Y 
is the fishing revenue for the trip; and Y=wd, where w is the average daily fish revenue. T is 
the reference (target) revenue level. α is a parameter representing how sensitive the captain is 
to deviation from the reference revenue.  I assume that α>1 reflects loss aversion.  θ is a 
parameter for the disutility of fishing effort.  γ is the inverse elasticity parameter of revenue 
with respect to fishing days.   
There are two elements in the utility function. The first element represents utility, 
which varies depending on how much the actual fishing revenue exceeds the target (Y-T). 
The second element is the standard disutility function. The utility function is kinked at Y=T.  
When the captain exceeds the target revenue level (Y>T), the marginal utility is 1, which 
implies that a revenue increase of $1 results in a 1 unit increase in utility.  When the captain 
has not exceeded the target revenue level (Y<T), the marginal utility is α,  which is greater 
than 1, which implies that a revenue increase of $1 leads to more than a 1 unit increase in 
utility.  In this case, the captain places more values on a $1 revenue increase because the 
captain has yet to reach the point where Y>T and, thus, is more willing to continue fishing.  
A productive fishing trip shortens the time before the captain can achieve the target goal (i.e. 
Y>T), whereas an unproductive trip lengthens the time the captain to achieve the target goal, 
as there is incentive to fish longer so long as Y<T   Intuitively, this depicts the negative 
relationship between daily fishing revenue and trip length.  I will formally show under what 
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circumstance this relationship will occur.               
 
Case 1: Y<T  
Substitute Y = wd into (6), we have: 
1U(d) (wd T) d                      
1
+γθ= α − − + ν                                                                          (11) 
Solving the first order condition (FOC) to optimize the captain’s utility, we have: 
*
1/
*U(d=d*) w0 w (d ) d
d
γ
γ∂ α⎛ ⎞= ⇔α =θ ⇔ =⎜ ⎟∂ θ⎝ ⎠                                                                        (12) 
The FOC then results in
1/wd*
γα⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠ . To find the threshold values for w and d, we consider 
the case wd* =Y*=T*. Solving for d* and w* we have 
1/wd*                                                       
γα⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠                                                            (13) 
1
1 1w* T                                             
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+γ⎝ ⎠ +γ⎝ ⎠θ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟α⎝ ⎠                                                                (14) 
Case 2: Y>T 
In this case, α=1. Follow the same procedure as Case 1.  By substituting α=1 into (13) and 
(14), we have 
1/wd**                                                                   
γ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠                                                              (15) 
1
1 1w ** T                                                                 
γ
+γ +γ= θ                                                   (16) 
Using equations (13) to (16), we can show that the optimal number of fishing days doptimal can 
be one of the following: 
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 w<w* then  
1/⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
optimal wd
γα
θ                                                                                             (17) 
 w>w**  then 
1/⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
optimal wd
γ
θ                                                                                              (18) 
 w*<w<w** then =optimal Td
w
                                                                                              (19) 
  where 
1
1 1w* T
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+γ⎝ ⎠ +γ⎝ ⎠θ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟α⎝ ⎠  and 
1
1 1w ** T
γ
+γ +γ= θ , respectively. 
As such, there is a positive correlation between the optimal number of fishing days 
(doptimal) and the average daily fishing revenue (w) when w<w* or w>w** (eq. 17 &18). This 
positive correlation is in accordance with predictions from the standard inter-temporal model 
of labor supply.  In addition, there is a negative correlation between the number of fishing 
days and the daily fish revenue when w*<w<w** (eq. 19).  Thus, the revenue target model 
can address a broader range of impacts that daily revenue may have on the fishing trip length.  
Under the revenue target model, it is plausible that an increase in daily fishing revenue 
results in shorter trips.  The following section empirically explores revenue target model’s 
ability to describe the behavior of Hawaii longline fishermen.  
 
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
Data Source and Model Specifications 
 
 
Information on the number of fishing days by trip and trip revenue is obtained from 
2004 logbook data and 2004 auction data, respectively.  It is worth noting that the swordfish 
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fishery was closed in Hawaii during 2004, thus, our data includes information on tuna fishery 
only. Hereafter, longline fishery refers to only the tuna fishery. The logbook is compiled by 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  The auction data is 
collected by the Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources (HDAR).  The logbook data contains 
information on the number of fishing days for every longline trip in 2004, and the auction 
data records the trip revenue for each longline vessel in that same year.  These two datasets 
were combined for the estimation of the empirical model. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. The average length of a 
fishing trip in the Hawaii longline fisheries is about 19 days.  Variation of the number of 
fishing days is relatively large.  An average vessel earns about $32,000 per trip or $1,800 per 
fishing day.   
The standard deviations in fish revenues are relatively large reflecting the diversity of 
vessel characteristics within the fisheries. The vessels are distributed almost equally across 
three ethnic groups of owners: Caucasian, Korean, and Vietnamese.  About 50% of captains 
have 16 years of longline fishing.  In terms of the vessel’s capacity, about 35% of vessels 
have an ice maker.   
  
Model Specifications 
 
 
I first start with the basic empirical model, which takes the following form:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                  ln ln (20)= + +it it it itD W Xη β ε 1 
                                                 
1Given that number of fishing days is count data one can use a generalized linear model such 
as a Poisson model to investigate the relationship between the number of fishing days and 
daily revenue.  In this study, we’re more interested in the elasticity of fishing day with 
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where itD  represents the number of fishing days by vessel  i on trip t, itW  is the average daily 
revenue of vessel i on trip t, Xit are the vessel’s characteristics that may impact the trip’s 
fishing length; εit is the standard error term.  Camerer et al. (1997) points out that this method 
of estimating itW  is a very similar method used in the labor supply literature, where wage rate 
is estimated by dividing yearly (monthly) income by yearly (monthly) working hours.  Thus, 
η  is interpreted as the daily revenue elasticity. 
I include a binary variable indicating the presence of an ice maker.  To account for 
the high demand of fish during the holiday season, I use a dummy variable to represent the 
holiday seasons, i.e.,  Thanksgiving and Christmas. 
In terms of model specification, ideally one can look at the daily revenue for each day 
in a given trip.  This makes it possible to estimate the accumulated revenue at any given 
fishing day.  The cumulative revenue is the deciding factor influencing whether the captain 
continues to fish or not.  However, I don’t have information on daily revenue for each 
individual fishing trip, thus I use the average daily revenue as the dependent variable.  
The use the average daily revenue may cause potential measurement error.  Camerer 
et al. (1997) and Chou (2002) in their studies on taxi drivers mention that there may have 
been measurement errors in the recorded number of driving hours.  This problem is known as 
division bias in labor economics studies (Borjas, 1980).  Likewise, one may suspect potential 
                                                                                                                                                       
respect to daily revenue, thus we take the log of the number of fishing data in turn making 
the dependent variable continuous. We then use a standard linear model (OLS) accordingly. 
To check the robustness of the results, we also run the Poisson model. The finding indicates a 
more significant negative relationship between number of fishing days and daily revenue. 
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measurement errors in the number of fishing days compiled in the logbook. Since such is the 
case, inflated records may increase the number of fishing days and deflate average trip 
revenue, while deflated records may decrease the number of fishing days and inflate average 
trip revenue.  Both cases of misreporting fishing days lead to spurious negative elasticity.  On 
the other hand, the daily revenue elasticity may be biased towards zero due to an over 
reporting of total trip revenue.  These two sources of bias will either reinforce or counteract 
each other, depending on whether the true daily revenue elasticity is positive or negative. 
Therefore, the net effect is uncertain; I show this result in the appendix.   
In the fisheries context, the logbook contains the record of the number of fishing days 
made by each vessel, as it is required by law for fishermen to complete their logs.  After 
every trip, NOAA collects the logbook directly from the captain and ensures that key 
information, such as fishing days, is recorded correctly. Thus, the data quality, particularly 
regarding fishing trip days, is quite accurate.  Potential measurement errors are more likely to 
come from the trip revenue data.  
Greene (2004) points out that measurement error in the dependent variable is less 
serious than in the independent variable. Accordingly, I will mainly focus on correcting 
potential measurement errors in the independent variable (i.e. the daily revenue). The 
corrections are made by finding an appropriate instrumental variable.  Given the data 
available, I use the average daily fish revenue of other vessels landing on the same day as the 
instrument for daily revenue.  In theory, a good instrument has the covariance of zero, or is 
unrelated to total fishing days, and has a strong correlation with the daily revenue of the 
concerned vessel.  I believe that the chosen variable has minimal or no impact on the 
captain’s decision to adjust the trip length (dependent variable) and is not highly correlated 
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with the error terms in the trip length equation.  I have also found that the greater (lower) the 
daily revenue of other vessels, the higher (lower) the daily revenue of the concerned vessel 
since they face the same market conditions at the auction.  Understandably, this interpretation 
is made under the assumption that there is not much variation in the fishing conditions. 
As a final note of this section, I realize that the above chosen instrumental variable is 
not perfect in any way. That being said, I believe that it is the best instrumental variable (IV) 
I can have given the data at hand. Another practical consideration is whether the chosen 
instrument is strong. Cameron and Trivedi (2006) point out that the weak IV estimator may 
be markedly biased in finite samples even though it is asymptotically consistent.  To check 
whether or not the instrument variable is weak I use the Cragg-Donald Wald statistics, which 
is a F statistic in the first stage, and compare it with the Stock-Yoko (2005) critical values to 
check whether the instrumental variable is weak or not.  The Cragg-Donald Wald statistics of 
21.75 from our 2SLS model indicate a reasonably strong instrumental variable.   
 
 
Main Empirical Findings 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation from OLS and 2SLS models. In addition 
to the OLS and 2SLS models, I also consider the fixed effects model given the heterogeneity 
of the vessels, such as the vessel’s physical characteristics, the demographics of the vessel’s 
owner and captain as well to check the robustness of the model. The key finding is that daily 
fishing revenue has a negative and significant impact on the number of fishing days in the 
OLS, 2SLS, and fixed effect models.  That is, the higher the daily revenue is, the shorter the 
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fishing trip.  This finding is consistent with the taxi drivers studies by Camerer et al. (1997) 
and Chou (2002).  From Heath, Larrick, and Wu’s insights (1999), I can infer that fishermen 
seem more motivated to reach the revenue target rather than to surpass it. 
The absolute value of the estimated revenue elasticity for the 2SLS model is 
marginally greater than the OLS implying that there may be marginal measurement error in 
the instrumental variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006).   In comparison with Camerer et al. 
(1997) and Chou (2002) studies, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to daily revenue in 
the fisheries is smaller in magnitude. The smaller elasticity may reflect that fishermen have 
less flexibility in choosing the length of a fishing trip due to the vessel capacity constraints. 
In addition to daily revenue, other variables also have significant and expected effects 
on the number of fishing days. The presence of an ice maker significantly increases the 
number of fishing days because it enables the vessel to preserve the fish quality longer.  
From the estimations, I can also infer that trip length is significantly shorter during the 
holiday seasons.  One possible reason is that fishermen receive higher profits due to higher 
prices from the increased demand of fish during the holidays. Accordingly, there is an 
incentive to shorten the fishing trip, in exchange for increasing the number of fishing trips.  
Following Chou (2002) and other traditional studies of labor supply, I also integrate 
non-budgetary variables into the fishing day’s equation, such as captain’s education and his 
longline fishing experience (Table 3). The effect of education on the number of fishing days 
is positive and is consistent with most other studies (e.g., Chou’s). Regarding fishing 
experience, the more experienced the captain, the longer the fishing trip. Such finding, 
however, is not consistent with studies in other industries (e.g., Chou’s) 
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V. ETHNICITY AND REVENUE TARGET MODEL 
 
A distinguishing feature of the Hawaii longline fisheries is the ethnic diversity of its 
vessel owners. Chou (2002) argues that Chinese cab drivers are more business savvy and 
thus, are less likely to behave according to the revenue target model in comparison with other 
drivers.  I find in the context of the Hawaii longline fisheries that ethnicity plays a key role in 
the decision-making process for labor supply.  Vessels owners in the Hawaii fleet are one of 
three ethnicities: Caucasian, Korean, and Vietnamese.  Due to some cultural similarities, I 
have combined Korean and Vietnamese under “Asian”. Ethnic backgrounds tell how vessel 
operators act in relation to the target revenue model.  Asian owners, who are known for 
working hard, may continue fishing when the fishing conditions are good regardless of how 
long the trip has been going on.  Hence, Asian owners may be less likely to follow the target 
revenue model. I expect that the integration of ethnicity into the empirical analysis of the 
target revenue model provides another perspective of decision-making behavior on labor 
supply. 
Table 4 presents related statistics of the vessel by ethnicity. I can see that Asian 
vessels fish longer (day per trip) than Caucasian boats, though the difference is negligible. 
Caucasian boats, however, appear more profitable than their Asian counterparts.   
As far as the regression analysis is concerned (Table 5), the only significant result is a 
negative impact of daily revenue on fishing length among Asian-owned vessels.  One 
possible reason for the insignificant result among Caucasian boats is due to reduced 
efficiency in the 2SLS model (increase in the standard errors).  In the pooled OLS model 
which I do not report here, the revenue elasticity is negative and significant among both 
 21
groups of vessels.  In both econometric models, the absolute value of elasticity is greater for 
Asian-owned vessels, and thus, I can infer that Asian-owned boats are more likely to behave 
according to the target revenue model. 
This finding describes how ethnicity impacts the modeling of preferences.  Caucasian 
owners seems quicker to make optimal decisions regarding trip length as suggested by the 
standard model. They will find it advantageous to fish longer on a productive trip or to fish 
shorter on an unproductive trip.  
 
VI. LONGLINE FISHING EXPERIENCE AND THE TARGET REVENUE MODEL 
 
The relevance of working experience in the target revenue model has been 
investigated in Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002).  Camerer et al. find that more 
experienced cab drivers have smaller revenue elasticities than less experienced divers. Chou, 
on the other hand, finds that this difference is not statistically significant.  I expect that, over 
time, more experienced vessel operators will learn that it is efficient to behave according to 
the standard economic model.  I also expect to see that more experienced vessel operators 
exhibit lower daily revenue elasticities in magnitude than vessels with less experienced 
captains. 
Summary statistics of the Hawaii longline fisheries from Table 6 reveal that vessels 
with more experienced captains have longer trip length as well as higher total trip revenues. 
On the other hand, vessels with less experienced captains have higher daily revenues. 
Table 7 presents the major regression estimation results. As expected, less 
experienced captains are more likely to behave according to the target revenue model.  More 
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experienced captains also shorten their trips as their daily revenue increases; however, the 
effect is not significant.  The Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) indicates 
that the difference in revenue elasticity is insignificant. 
 
VII.  CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE REVENUE TARGET MODEL 
 
Unlike taxi drivers who in principle, can drive for an indefinite period of time, vessel 
captains face capacity constraints that prevent them from fishing past a certain amount of 
time, such as fuel and the preservation of fish quality. Therefore, the prediction of a positive 
revenue elasticity by the standard model of labor supply may not apply to fishing vessels due 
to the existing constraints.  For instance, the captain might decide to go home even in a good 
trip to preserve the fish freshness. To proxy for the dependence of vessels on capacity 
constraint, I use a binary variable representing whether or not the vessel has an ice-maker. 
Because of their less dependence on capacity constraints, vessels with ice makers are more 
likely to behave according to the standard model of labor supply provided the standard model 
correctly describes the captain’s fishing behavior.  
Table 8 summarizes statistics of vessels with and without an ice maker. As expected, 
vessels with ice makers fish longer than vessels without ice makers though the difference is 
insignificant.  Vessels with ice makers are also more profitable on a per trip and per day 
basis.  To investigate the effect of capacity constraints on fishing behavior under the target 
revenue framework, I run the 2SLS model for vessels with and without ice makers 
separately. The key result is presented in Table 9.    
Our results suggest that only vessels with ice makers seem likely to follow the target 
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revenue model: an increase in revenue would decrease the trip length.  This result enhances 
support for the target revenue model since vessels with ice makers are more able to follow 
the standard model if the captains behaved according to the standard model. The difference 
in daily revenue elasticity among these two groups of vessels; however, is not statistically 
significant.  The Wu-Hausman’s t-value is well below the 5% significant level. 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study attempts to provide another perspective within the existing labor supply 
literature. I developed a simple target revenue model to show, under certain conditions, that 
increases in daily fishing revenue lead to decreases in trip length.  Using OLS, 2SLS, and 
fixed effects models, I found a significantly negative correlation between daily revenue and 
the trip length. The more productive their fishing trip is, the shorter the captain will choose to 
make their fishing trip. This finding implies that Hawaii fishermen tend to have a revenue 
target for their fishing trips. In terms of policy implication, the finding that Hawaii fishermen 
seem to behave in accordance with the target revenue model prove very relevant as Lynham 
et al., (2007) using simulation point out that standard policies can achieve biological goals 
under such circumstance. 
I also investigated how unique features of the fisheries impact fishermen behavior 
under the target revenue framework.  I separated the vessels into groups with and without ice 
makers to see if capacity constraint impact trip length.  I found that vessels with ice makers 
are more likely to follow the target revenue model. I also found that Asian American vessel 
owners exhibit negative daily revenue elasticities, but Caucasian vessels owners appear more 
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optimal in that there is a less significant negative response to increases in daily revenue.  
Regarding the longline fishing experience of the vessel operator, I found that only vessels 
with less experienced captains behave in accordance with the target revenue model.   
This study, like Camerer et al. (1997), Chou (2002), and Fehr and Goette (2004, 
2006), highlights the relevance of integrating prospect theory into the framework of labor 
economics.  The fact that certain clusters of fishermen are more likely to behave according to 
the target revenue model suggests the necessity of classifying agents into certain groups 
before modeling their decision-making behavior.      
This paper can be improved in a number of aspects. The use of an imperfect 
instrumental variable may lead to less biased estimations at the expense of an efficiency loss. 
In some estimations, the results from the 2SLS model became less significant than the OLS 
by increasing the standard errors. An approach based on a system of structural equations and 
natural experiments may help solve this problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006). 
As a potential extension of the paper, I can conduct further field experiments with 
Hawaii longline fishermen to measure the loss aversion parameter for each participant and 
identify a model that best describes the agent’s risk behavior.  Fehr and Goette (2006) 
suggest either a reference dependence model or neoclassical model with non-separable 
preferences.  They also find that loss-averse participants are more likely to behave in 
accordance with the target model. Integrating the risk behavior of fishermen under prospect 
theory of which loss aversion is an important aspect, into the framework of fisheries decision 
making is a promising area in fisheries research. 
Another potential extension of this study is to investigate how well the target model 
performs relative to the hazard model by Farber.   In his study of taxi cab drivers, Farber 
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(2005, 2008) finds the standard model more favorable than the target revenue model.  Our 
study of the Hawaii longline fisheries reveals that the target revenue model gives robust 
findings under different model specifications.  As a result, I believe that our results will 
probably hold under Farber’s approach.  That being said, the current study would be more 
complete if I could also use Farber’s approach to check the robustness of the results. 
However, I presently do not have information on the daily vessel revenue for a given fishing 
trip.  Improvement on logbook data collection will allow us to investigate the relative 
performance of the target revenue model against the standard model of labor supply.  
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APPENDIX 
 
PROOF OF AMBIGUOUS DIVISION BIAS IN OLS 
 
Consider an econometric model for fishing trip length: 
* *
                                                                                                                                                                       ln *ln A1= + +i i iD Wα β ε  
where iD  is the true number of fishing days for vessel i; iW  is the corresponding true daily 
revenue. By definition, iW   = iY / iD  where iW  is the trip revenue. 
 
Suppose, there is some measurement error in the number of fishing days and trip revenue, 
such that, * *i i  i ii iln D ln D  and ln W ln W= +η = + γ .  I are assuming that: 
Cov(ηi, εi)= Cov(γi, εi)=0 
Due to measurement errors, model (1) becomes: 
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ln *(ln ln ) A2
or equivalently,
ln *(ln ln )
−
+
= + − + − +
= + − + − +
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
D Y D
D Y D
η α β γ η ε
α β γ η η ε                                                                            
                                         
A3
Therefore, we end up estimating the following equation:
ln *(ln ) += + + − +i i i i i iD Wα β γ η η ε                                                                          
^ , ,
)
A4
Using OLS to estimate, we have:
cov(ln ln ) cov{ln *(ln ) }plim
var(ln ) var(ln var(
++ − + − + += =+ − +
i i i i i i i i i i
ols
i i i i i
W D W W
W W
γ η γ η α β η εβ γ η γ )
^ ,
^ ,
var( )
var(ln ) var( ) cov( )plim
var(ln )
var(ln ) cov( ) var( )plim            A5
var(ln ) var( ) var( ) var(ln ) var( ) var( )
+
− += + −
−= ++ + + +
i
i i i i
ols
i i i
i i i i
ols
i i i i i i
W
W
W
W W
η
β η η γβ γ η
η γ ηβ β γ η γ η
 
From A5, I can infer that: 
 i.  If ,cov( ) var( )<i i iη γ η  then ^plim <olsβ β , thus OLS gives negative bias.  
 ii. If ,cov( ) var( )>i i iη γ η , the effect of measurement errors on βOLS is ambiguous. 
 
As discussed, in the case of Hawaii thanks to good quality on the number of fishing days I 
can assume i 0η ≈ , therefore: 
^ var(ln )plim   <                                                                     A6
var(ln ) var( )
= +
i
ols
i i
W
W
β β βγ  
This is a classical case of measurement error where OLS’s estimate is attenuationly 
(decreasingly) bias toward zero. Accordingly, 2SLS with valid instrumental variable will 
give
^ ^
2SLS OLSβ > β .
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Total  (1309 obs) 
# Fishing days 
Daily revenue ($) 
Trip revenue ($) 
Having Ice Maker (1: Yes, 2:No) 
Ethnicity (1: Caucasian, 2: Korean, 3: 
Vietnamese) 
 
Longline Fishing Experience (years) 
 
 
18.77 
1794 
32225 
0.35 
1.86 
 
 
17.13 
 
 
19.00 
1648 
31033 
0 
2 
 
 
16 
 
 
5.03 
871 
14239 
0.47 
0.82 
 
 
10.22 
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY FROM OLS, 2SLS 
AND FIXED EFFECT MODELS 
OLS 2SLS Fixed Effect  
Coef t value Coef t value Coef t value 
 
Log of daily revenue 
 
Ice maker 
 
Holiday seasons 
 
Adjusted R2 
Number of observations 
 
-0.13 
 
0.04 
 
-0.15 
 
0.12 
864 
 
-7.27(***) 
 
2.38(***) 
 
-7.01(***) 
 
 
 
-0.19
 0.05
-0.14
0.10
864
 
-2.45(***) 
 
2.48(***) 
 
-6.08(***) 
 
-0.17 
 
0.07 
 
-0.15 
 
0.12 
864 
 
-9.88(***) 
 
 1.41 
 
-8.09(***)  
Note: (***) indicates significance at 1% level 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY FROM OLS,  2 
SLS AND FE MODELS INCLUDING NON-BUDGET CONSTRAINT VARIABLES 
Pooled OLS 2SLS Fixed Effect  
Coef T value Coef t value Coef t value 
 
Log of daily revenue 
 
Ice maker 
 
Holiday seasons 
 
Fishing experience 
 
Fishing experience 
squared 
 
Education level 
 
Adjusted R2 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
-0.12 
 
0.04 
 
-0.15 
 
0.01 
 
-0.0003 
 
0.04 
 
0.15 
840 
 
-7.10 
 
1.93 
 
-7.10 
 
5.03 
 
-4.90 
 
3.16 
 
 
 
 
-0.15 
 
0.04 
 
-0.15 
 
0.01 
 
-0.0003 
 
0.04 
 
0.14 
840 
 
-2.07(**) 
 
1.95(**) 
 
-6.33(***) 
 
5.00(***) 
 
-4.89(***) 
 
3.11 (**) 
 
 
 
-0.17 
 
 
 
-0.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
840 
 
-9.88(***) 
 
 
 
-8.09(***)
Note: (**) indicates 1% significance level, (***) indicates 5% significance level 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VESSELS BY OWNER ETHNICITY 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Caucasian Owner (533 obs) 
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
Caucasian Owner (776 obs) 
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
18.40 
 
1910 
 
33828 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
1715 
 
31124 
 
 
 
18 
 
1798 
 
32502 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
1590 
 
30136 
 
 
 
4.43 
 
909 
 
15292 
 
 
 
 
5.39 
 
835 
 
13108 
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY BY VESSEL 
OWNER’S ETHNICITY ESTIMATED BY 2SLS 
Caucasian Asian  
Coef t value Coef t value 
 
Log of daily revenue 
 
Ice maker 
 
Holiday season 
 
Fishing experience 
 
Fishing experience square 
 
Education 
 
Number of observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
-0.10 
 
0.01 
 
-0.10 
 
0.01 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.10 
 
351 
 
0.15 
 
-1.02 
 
0.43 
 
-2.38(***) 
 
2.87(***) 
 
-1.67 (*) 
 
4.05 (***) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.17 
 
0.04 
 
-0.19 
 
0.01 
 
-0.0004 
 
0.04 
 
-1.64(*) 
 
1.09 
 
-6.24(***) 
 
2.70(***) 
 
-3.47(***) 
 
2.36 (**) 
 
489 
 
0.15 
Note: (*) indicates 10% significance level; (**) indicates 5% significance level 
          (***) indicates 1% significance level. 
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TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VESSELS BY CAPTAIN’S FISHING 
EXPERIENCE 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Less Experienced (405 obs) 
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
More Experienced (461 obs) 
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
18.38 
 
1836 
 
31971 
 
 
 
 
19.1 
 
1763 
 
32568 
 
 
18 
 
1695 
 
31160 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
1603 
 
31222 
 
 
5.34 
 
908 
 
14142 
 
 
 
 
4.71 
 
849 
 
14693 
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TABLE 7: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY BY 
CAPTAIN’S LONGLINE FISHING EXPERIENCE 
Less Experienced More Experienced  
Coef T value Coef t value 
 
Log of daily revenue 
 
Ice maker 
 
Holiday season 
 
Education 
 
 
Number of observations 
 
-0.31 
 
0.07 
 
-0.07 
 
0.03 
 
 
397 
 
-2.43(***) 
 
2.48(***) 
 
-1.60 
 
1.45 
 
-0.05 
 
0.03 
 
-0.21 
 
0.04 
 
 
443 
 
-0.5 
 
0.88 
 
-7.14(***) 
 
2.15(**) 
 
 
Note: (**) indicates 5% significance level, (***) indicates 1% significance level 
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TABLE 8: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VESSELS BY WHETHER HAVING ICE 
MAKER 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Vessels without ice maker (577 
obs) 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
Vessels with ice maker (304 obs)
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
18.61 
 
1732 
 
30886 
 
 
 
19.10 
 
1927 
 
35124 
 
 
19 
 
1612 
 
30289 
 
 
 
19 
 
1760 
 
33595 
 
 
4.91 
 
859 
 
13918 
 
 
 
5.27 
 
900 
 
15262 
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TABLE 9: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY BY VESSEL’S 
CAPACITY BY 2SLS 
Without Ice Makers With Ice Makers  
Coef t value Coef t value 
 
Log of daily revenue 
 
Holiday season 
 
Fishing experience 
 
Fishing experience square 
 
Education 
 
Number of observations 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.13 
 
0.01 
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.05 
 
546 
 
0.12 
 
 
-1.31 
 
-4.29(***) 
 
3.66(***) 
 
-3.91(***) 
 
-3.26(***) 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.18 
 
0.02 
 
-0.0005 
 
-0.02 
 
294 
 
0.18 
 
-1.71 (*) 
 
-4.85 (***) 
 
2.33 (**) 
 
-2.15 (**) 
 
-1.05 
 
 
Note: (*) indicates 10% significance level, (**) indicates 5% significance level 
         (***) indicates 1% significance level. 
